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I. INTRODUCTION
You get what you pay for, right? Well, not always. There is a
loophole in the law that allows the government to take away valuable
private property rights, through regulation, without compensation.' Spe-
cifically, the government can impose regulations on private property that
limit its use and result in a diminution in its fair market value, without
2having to pay the property owner a cent. Accordingly, many property
owners are denied the full benefit of their bargain because they are not
compensated for a reduction in the value of their land caused by land-use
regulations that restrict uses of the property that were permitted when the
owner originally purchased the land.3
Imagine, for example, a developer who invests ten million dollars
in acquiring 100 acres of undeveloped residential land. The purchase
price reflects the fact that the property is zoned at a density of one house
per acre. Thus, the developer makes this investment with the intent of
building and selling 100 houses, yielding an estimated five million dollar
profit. However, before the houses are built, the local government, in an
effort to reduce urban sprawl, enacts a land-use regulation which restricts
the land to agricultural use. Such a regulation would result in a vast
diminution of the property's value, as well as a loss of the developer's
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five million dollar expected profit. Consequently, the developer whose
land has been restricted is forced to bear the entire economic cost of a
land-use regulation that is designed to benefit the public as a whole, in
this case by reducing urban sprawl.
Furthermore, any private property owner, no matter how large or
small, may be forced to bear disproportionate burdens resulting from
land-use regulations designed to benefit society at large.4 For instance,
imagine a young couple who buys a house where they envision raising
their children. Further, suppose the couple purchases the particular parcel
because it abuts wetlands; thus, the property will always be ensured pri-
vacy, as nothing can be built on the wetlands. Additionally, suppose the
property has a spacious twenty-foot-deep backyard in which they intend
to build a pool and a swing set for their children. Unfortunately, these
plans are destroyed by a subsequent government regulation which wid-
ens the buffer zone along the wetlands by an additional twenty feet. Such
a regulation subsumes their backyard, leaving the couple with no usable
land, as they are now prohibited from putting any structures in their
backyard.
As a final hypothetical, imagine a diner that bums to the ground in
an accidental fire. Despite the fact that the business might be in compli-
ance with governmental regulations when it bums down, the government
may later refuse to permit the owners to rebuild their business because
the government has changed land-use regulations in the interim.
As these possibilities demonstrate, there are a myriad of ways in
which a private property owner may be adversely affected by land-use
regulations. This adverse effect is caused by the fact that, unlike the re-
quirement for compensation when the government "takes" property via
eminent domain, 5 there is no requirement that the government compen-
sate a property owner when the "taking" is effectuated through burden-
some land-use regulations not in effect when the property owner pur-
chased the land.6
The legal term "property" denotes not merely a tangible thing, but
also the rights in and appurtenant to that thing.7 These rights, often col-
4. Id.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 1-12(a), at 216 (3d
ed. 2005).
6. See I JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42[31 (rev. 3d ed. 2006).
7. See Manufactured Hous. Cmtys. v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347, 367 n.10, 13 P.3d. 183, 193
(2000) (quoting William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV.
553, 600 (1972)); id. at 380 (citing State ex. rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 26 Wash. 278, 287, 66 P.
385, 388 (1901)). "Property in a thing consists not merely of its ownership and possession, but in the
unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal. Anything which destroys any of the elements of
property, to that extent, destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use.
If the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a
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lectively termed a "bundle of rights," include the rights to possess, to
use, to exclude, to profit, and to dispose. 8 As early as 1900, it was noted
that "when a person is deprived of any of those rights, he is to that extent
deprived of his property, and hence, that his property may be taken, in
the constitutional sense, though his title and possession remain undis-
turbed." 9 Accordingly, when a government regulation modifies the bun-
dle of rights associated with owning property, the government is argua-
bly "taking" the landowner's "property" in the constitutional sense, thus
requiring the owner to be compensated.' 0 This type of "taking" is charac-
terized as a "regulatory taking.""
A "regulatory taking" occurs when the government diminishes the
value or usefulness of private property "by a regulatory action that does
not involve a physical occupation of the property."' 2 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has conceded that "the attempt to distinguish 'regulation'
from 'taking' is the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of
contemporary land-use law."'' 3
Although property rights are protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, there is much debate over "the
degree to which they are protected and the degree to which they are lim-
ited by the interests of the general public."' 4 Thus, there is an inevitable
tension between the government's right to regulate in the public interest
and the constitutional right of citizens to the enjoyment of private prop-
erty, free from unreasonable restrictions.' 5 It is clear that the government
must have the power to regulate property; however, the extent to which
government may restrict private property rights in the name of the public
interest is not as apparent.
barren right." Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 400, 409, 348 P.2d 664, 669 (1960) (quoting
Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1921)).
8. See United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 367 (6th Cir. 1997).
9. See Manufactured Hous. Cmtys., 142 Wash. 2d at 379, 13 P.3d at 199 (citing State ex. rel.
Smith, 26 Wash. at 287, 66 P. at 388). "[W]hen the government takes one right from the bundle
which comprises 'property,' it thereby takes an aspect or attribute of property itself.... If one of the
rights of property has been damaged or removed from the bundle, the property has accordingly been
damaged or taken to that extent." Id. (emphasis added).
10. See supra note 5.
11. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
12. See Hotel & Motel Ass'n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Berst v.
Snohomish County, 114 Wash. App. 245, 255-56, 57 P.3d 273, 278 (2002) (quoting Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)).
13. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 n.15 (1981) (quoting
CHARLES M. HARR, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE AND RE-USE OF
URBAN LAND 766 (3d ed. 1976)).
14. THOMAS E. ROBERTS, TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PERSPECTIVES 2 (2001).
15. See 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning & Planning § 37 (2005); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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While regulatory actions are generally intended to protect or im-
prove the well-being of citizens and the environment, they may impose
costs on isolated private property owners by limiting the use or develop-
ment of their land. 16 This often results in an unfair distribution of the
costs and benefits of the imposed regulation, as individuals are forced to
bear the cost of a regulation whose benefits are enjoyed by society as a
whole. Accordingly, one of the principal purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause, 7 in prohibiting the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation, is to prevent the government
"from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'' 8
To effectuate that goal, in November 2004, Oregon voters passed a
ballot initiative, Measure 37, which imposed the most progressive regu-
latory takings compensation statute in the country.19 Although planners
and environmentalists have praised Oregon's aggressive policies de-
signed to preserve open space and limit growth,2 ° the passage of the citi-
zen-sponsored Measure 37 indicated that Oregon citizens were dissatis-
fied with the state's means of achieving its land-use goals. Measure 37
enacted a statute requiring the government to pay just compensation
when the government enacts or enforces a land-use regulation that re-
stricts the use of the property and results in a reduction in the fair market
16. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REGULATORY TAKINGS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE I
(1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/10xx/doclO51/takings.pdf [hereinafter CBO
REGULATORY TAKINGS]; see also Standards.gov, http://standards.gov/standardsgov/v/Regulations/
index.cfm (last visited July 27, 2006).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
19. See generally OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET: VOLUME I - STATE
MEASURES 104 (2004), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/
m37_bt.html [hereinafter OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET VOL. 1] (providing the ballot title, the text of
the measure, an explanatory statement, and arguments in favor and in opposition of the measure);
see also OREGONIANS IN ACTION, BALLOT MEASURE 37: BREAKDOWN OF THE VOTE,
http://measure37.com/measure%2037/vote breakdown.html (last visited July 27, 2006) [hereinafter
BREAKDOWN OF THE VOTE] (providing statistics on votes for Measure 37 by district).
20. In 1973, the Oregon Legislature adopted Senate Bill 100, establishing a statewide central-
ized land-use planning system. See David J. Hunnicutt, Oregon Land-Use Regulation and Ballot
Measure 3 7: Newton's Third Law at Work, 36 ENVTL. L. 25, 27-28 (2006). Senate Bill 100 created a
state agency, the Department of Land Conservation and Development, which developed 19 statewide
planning goals through its Land Conservation and Development Commission ("LCDC"). Id. at 28-
29. Accordingly, local governments were stripped of their land-use planning authority, as Senate Bill
100 required local governments to adopt comprehensive land-use plans and zoning ordinances in
compliance with the statewide goals. Id. at 29. These goals are intended to concentrate development
in urban areas, while preserving forest and agricultural land in rural areas. Id. at 29; see also OR.
DEPT. OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV., STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS, http://egov.oregon.gov/
LCD/goals.shtml (last visited July 31, 2006).
21. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005).
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value of the property.22 As an alternative to compensation, the govern-
ment may choose to modify, remove, or not apply the regulation to the
owner's property. 23 Despite opponents of Measure 37 outspending pro-
ponents at a rate of more than two-to-one, 24 the measure was approved
25by Oregon voters with nearly sixty-one percent of the vote, garnering
more votes than any initiative in Oregon history.26
The overwhelming passage of Measure 37 in Oregon has inspired
property rights advocates in other states to follow Oregon's lead in their
own efforts to strengthen property rights.27 In particular, Measure 37's
success has revived the property rights movement in Washington and
galvanized efforts to put a similar measure before the voters on the No-
vember 2006 ballot.28 Washington should follow Oregon's lead by enact-
ing a regulatory takings compensation statute so that society as a whole
equitably shares both the costs and the benefits of land-use regulations,
and individual property owners affected by such regulations are not un-
fairly deprived of the benefit of their bargain.
Part II of this Comment provides a background of regulatory tak-
ings jurisprudence, outlining both the U.S. Supreme Court's and Wash-
ington courts' respective analyses of regulatory takings challenges under
the takings clauses of both the U.S. and Washington Constitutions. Part
III discusses the threshold compensation statutes that have been enacted
by four states in an effort to remedy the problem of regulatory takings.
Part IV examines Oregon's Measure 37 and the lawsuit that validated its
22. See id. § 197.352(1).
23. See id. § 197.352(8).
24. The proponents began the campaign with a balance of $264,991.47 and raised another
$988,248.52, for a total of $1,253,239.99. See OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, ELECTRONIC FILING REPORT,
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES, FAMILY FARM PRESERVATION
PAC I (Sept. 23, 2004), http://egov.sos.state.or.us/elections/elecimages/4668_2004_
G100 ISTPRE.pdf; OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, ELECTRONIC FILING REPORT, SUMMARY STATEMENT OF
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES, FAMILY FARM PRESERVATION PAC I (Sept. 9, 2005),
http://egov.sos.state.or.us/elections/elec images/4668 2005_SUPL SUPP.pdf.
The opponents raised $2,727,828.03. See Or. Sec'y of State, Electronic Filing Report, Summary
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures, No on 37 Take a Closer Look Committee 1 (Dec. 2,
2004), http://egov.sos.state.or.us/elections/elecimages/4847_2004_G IOUPOST.pdf.
25. See OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 2, 2004, GENERAL ELECTION ABSTRACT OF VOTES:
STATE MEASURE NO. 37 (2004), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/
m37.pdf [hereinafter ABSTRACT OF VOTES].
26. See BREAKDOWN OF THE VOTE, supra note 19.
27. Brad Shannon, Money Flows to Initiative Efforts, THE OLYMPIAN (Olympia, Wash.), May
11, 2006, at I B; Eric Pryne, Property-rights Initiative Likely to Spark Fierce Fight, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at BI. See also Eric de Place, This Land is My Land, WASHINGTON LAW &
POLITICS, Oct.-Nov. 2005, at 18; Aaron Corvin, State Might Copy Oregon Property Rights Plan,
THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Jan. 15, 2005, at A 1.
28. Sam Howe Verhovek, Property Rights Law is Upheld in Oregon, THE LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A12.
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constitutionality. Part V analyzes Washington's proposed property rights
measure, Initiative 933, and argues that Washington needs a regulatory
takings compensation statute. Finally, Part VI concludes that Washington
should restore its residents' private property rights by enacting a regula-
tory takings compensation statute modeled after Oregon's Measure 37.
1I. BACKGROUND OF REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
Regulatory takings jurisprudence is grounded in the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the
federal government from taking private property for public use without
paying the owner just compensation. 29 This prohibition has been ex-
tended to state and local governments through the due process conduit of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 Accordingly, the Takings Clause pre-
scribes mandatory minimum limitations on state and local govern-
ments;31 however, state constitutions may afford property owners broader
protection.32 Moreover, all state constitutions include provisions compa-
rable to the federal Takings Clause.33 Washington's takings clause, for
example, provides that "[n]o private property shall be taken or damaged
for public or private use without just compensation having first been
made.",34
Analysis under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution usually
involves the relatively straightforward application of per se rules when
the government exercises its power of eminent domain to formally con-
demn private property for a public purpose, such as to build a post office
or a highway.35 However, the issue becomes convoluted when property
owners allege that a land-use regulation imposed by the government ef-
fects a "taking" of their property and that compensation ought to be
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is also referred to as
the Just Compensation Clause.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 652, 747 P.2d 1062,
1079 (1987) (the Fifth Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
31. See Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now
You Don't, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 339, 343 (1989); see also Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d at
652, 747 P.2d at 1079 (characterizing the Federal Constitution as establishing "a minimum floor of
protection below which state law may not go.").
32. See Settle, supra note 31, at 343; see also Eggleston v. Pierce County, 148 Wash. 2d 760,
766, 64 P.3d 618, 622 (2003) (stating that article 1, § 16 of Washington's constitution "in some ways
provides greater protection" than "its United States constitutional counterpart").
33. See Settle, supra note 31, at 343-44 (1989); see, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16; OR.
CONST. art. I, § 18.
34. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
35. See CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at ix; see also Brown v. Legal Found. of
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 217 (2003) (the government may exercise its power of eminent domain as long
as the taking is for a "public use" and the government pays the owner "just compensation").
[Vol. 30:287
Property Rights in Washington
paid.36 Property owners who believe that a government action resulted in
a "regulatory taking" may file suit against the government for violating
the Fifth Amendment 37 and demand compensation in a cause of action
known as inverse condemnation.38 However, the property owner carries
the burden of initiating suit against the government,39 as well as the bur-
den of proving that a regulatory taking has occurred.40
A land-use regulation may be challenged either as an unconstitu-
tional taking or as a violation of substantive due process.41 However,
there is an overlap between the test for a denial of substantive due proc-
ess and the test for a regulatory taking, which the Supreme Court has yet
to resolve. 42 Consequently, courts often erroneously mesh the two analy-
ses, adding to the uncertainty in this already convoluted area of the law.
A land-use regulation may be void for denial of substantive due process
if it does not substantially advance the public health, safety, or welfare.43
Moreover, even if the land-use regulation serves a substantial public pur-
pose, it may violate substantive due process if, balancing the benefit re-
ceived by the public from the regulation against the burden on the regu-
lated landowner, it is "unduly oppressive" on the landowner.44
Although courts have yet to develop a specific test for determining
when a land-use regulation becomes a taking, courts often balance vari-
ous ad hoc factors in an effort to determine whether the regulation has
36. See CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at ix; see also Brown, 538 U.S. at 217.
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. See EAGLE, supra note 5, § 8-9(d)(1), at 1157; JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER &
THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW § 10.2, at 419 (1998) [hereinafter
JUERGENSMEYER]. The U.S. Supreme Court defines inverse condemnation as "a cause of action
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by
the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has
been attempted by the taking agency." United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1981) (quoting D.
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328 (1971)).
39. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.2, at 419.
40. CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at 2.
41. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912
(1990); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 649, 747 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1987).
42. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.12, at 459-60 (1998) (declaring that the
test for a denial of substantive due process and the test for a regulatory taking "are virtually indistin-
guishable, and, over the years, the Court has incorporated its substantive due process case law into
its takings formula"); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.31, at 37 (1982) (noting an over-
lap between substantive due process and takings doctrine); Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substan-
tive Due Process, and Takings-An Integration, 74 NEB. L. REV. 843, 844 (1995) (suggesting that
the U.S. Supreme Court "has failed to maintain clear lines of demarcation between the substantive
due process and takings rules and has introduced some unnecessary overlap and confusion in their
application.").
43. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.12, at 455; MANDELKER, supra note 42, §
2.31, at 37. The test for denial of substantive due process can be traced back to the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
44. Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137; see also JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.12, at 459 (1998).
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gone "too far" and has thereby created an unreasonable restriction on the
landowner.45 The Washington Supreme Court conceded that a "doctrinal
blurring" has occurred between the test for a denial of substantive due
process and the test for a regulatory taking such that the tests "seem al-
most analytically identical. 46 However, a critical distinction between the
two constitutional doctrines lies in the remedy to be applied: the remedy
for a violation of substantive due process may be injunctive relief, such
that the regulation is invalidated, whereas the sole remedy for a taking is
just compensation.47
A. The U.S. Supreme Court's Analysis of Regulatory Takings Claims
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a
land-use regulation could cause a taking.48 The first decision by the Su-
preme Court finding that a land-use regulation violated the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause occurred in 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon.49 Writing for the Court in that case, Justice Holmes
struggled to conciliate the disparate positions surrounding regulatory tak-
ings. On the one hand, he recognized that "[g]overnment could hardly go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law." 50 On the other
hand, he established that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking., 51
45. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.2, at 426-27; MANDELKER, supra note 42, §
2.11, at 22. See also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
46. Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d at 647-48, 747 P.2d at 1077.
47. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.12, at 460; see also Orion Corp., 109 Wash. 2d at
649, 747 P.2d at 1077.
48. See ROBERTS, supra note 14, §1.1(b), at 4; see, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887). In Mugler, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a brewery owner's argument that his property
had been taken by a law prohibiting the manufacture of alcoholic beverages and that he should re-
ceive compensation. 123 U.S. at 623-25, 675. The Court found that a severe impairment to the value
of the brewery caused by a state prohibition law was not a taking, but rather the application ofjusti-
fled police power regulation, which was not burdened by a requirement of compensation. Id. at 671.
The Court declared that "all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community," id. at 665, and that "[a] prohibition sim-
ply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot in any sense, be deemed a taking or an appropria-
tion of property for the public benefit." Id. at 668-69.
49. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Mahon, the Supreme Court held that a
Pennsylvania state law forbidding mining that might cause subsidence was a regulatory taking when
the coal company had, by contract, expressly reserved the right to mine. Id.; see also ROBERTS,
supra note 14, § 1.1 (b), at 4.
50. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
51. Id. at 415. Justice Holmes warned that "[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 416.
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Since that decision, there has been much debate but no consensus on
what action constitutes going "too far." 52
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has continued to decide regulatory
takings claims on a case-by-case basis. 53 However, while the Court has
categorized the necessary inquiry into whether a regulatory taking has
occurred as ad hoc,54 it has attempted to establish a framework to assist
courts in determining what constitutes going "too far.",55
The Court has identified two clear instances, known as per se tak-
ings rules, in which a regulatory taking will usually be found. 6 First, a
regulation that results in a permanent physical occupation of private
property constitutes a per se taking.57 Since the right to exclude is "one
of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights, 58
the Court has held that a permanent physical occupation of property is a
taking no matter how small the intrusion or how great the public inter-
est. 59 Second, a regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically
beneficial or productive use of the property is a per se taking. 60
If the governmental action does not constitute a per se taking, the
Court generally analyzes three factors: (1) the economic impact of the
action on the property; (2) the extent to which the action interferes with
reasonable, investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character or ex-
tent of the government action. 6 However, because the Court often de-
scribes and weighs these factors in varying ways, it is difficult to accu-
rately predict how any particular regulatory takings claim will be de-
52. CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at 14.
53. See THEODORE J. NOVAK ET AL., CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY: PRACTICE AND
STRATEGIES FOR WINNING JUST COMPENSATION § 5.3, at 43, § 7.1, at 65 (1993). The Supreme
Court has noted that the question of defining what constitutes a taking "has proved to be a problem
of considerable difficulty." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
Further, the Court conceded that it "has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id. at
124.
54. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
55. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, at 427; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at
124.
56. See NOVAK, supra note 53, § 7.5, at 68.
57. See, e.g., Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
58. Id. at 435 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979)).
59. Id. at 426; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
60. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. The only exception to the requirement to pay just compensation
when a regulation is so severe that it prohibits all economically beneficial use of land is when the
government can demonstrate that the restrictions in the regulation are already found in the restric-
tions that the state's law of nuisance places upon land ownership. Id. at 1004.
61. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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cided. 62 Consequently, these inconsistent precedents provide little guid-
ance to lower courts.63
B. Washington 's Analysis of Regulatory Takings Claims
The Washington Supreme Court has attempted to conform its regu-
latory takings analysis to recent rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, as
Washington courts not only decide takings claims raised under the Wash-
ington constitution but also decide takings claims raised under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.64 The holdings of four landmark
cases-Presbytery,65 Sintra,66 Robinson,67 and Guimont 8-together con-
stitute the Washington Supreme Court's attempt to eliminate ad hoc de-
cision-making and consolidate all of the takings factors from federal ju-
risprudence into a comprehensive formula.6 9
First, the court employs a "threshold inquiry" to determine whether
to analyze a challenged regulation under the takings doctrine or substan-
tive due process. 70 The court begins its threshold inquiry by asking
whether the regulation destroys or derogates any fundamental attribute of
property ownership, including the right to possess, to exclude others, to
dispose of property, to prevent physical invasion, or to make some eco-
nomically viable use of the property.71 If the challenged regulation either
results in a "physical invasion" of private property or "denies all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of land," then a per se taking has
occurred and the property owner need not proceed with the remainder of
the analysis.72 A second threshold question asks "whether the challenged
62. CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at 16.
63. Id.
64. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 328, 787 P.2d 907, 911-12
(1990); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 652, 747 P.2d 1062, 1079 (1987) (stating "we must
ensure that our state approach conforms with the minimum due process floor set by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment."); 24 WASH. PRAC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 21.2 (noting that "state
constitutional standards have not yet been elaborated separately from federal standards.").
65. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 320, 787 P.2d at 907.
66. Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d I, 829 P.2d 765 (1992).
67. Robinson v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318 (1992).
68. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993).
69. 24 WASH. PRAC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 21.2; see also EAGLE, supra
note 5, § 8-1 0(a)(3), at 1176.
70. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 P.2d at 912; see also 24 WASH. PRAC.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 21.3-21.6 (describing nature and application of the
threshold test).
7 1. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 602, 854 P.2d at 10; see also Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 14 n.6, 829
P.2d at 772; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328; Presbylery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329-30,
787 P.2d at 912.
72. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1016 n.7 (1992); Guimont, 121
Wash. 2d at 598, 601, 737 P.2d at 8-9.
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regulation safeguards the public interest in health, safety, the environ-
ment or the fiscal integrity of an area, or whether the regulation seeks
less to prevent a harm than to impose on those regulated the requirement
of providing an affirmative public benefit." 73 The court only proceeds
with its takings analysis if the regulation in question either infringes on a
fundamental attribute of ownership, or if the regulation goes beyond
simply preventing a public harm and imposes its associated costs solely
on regulated property owners who unfairly bear the burden of providing
a public benefit. 74
If the regulation passes the threshold test, the court next examines
whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest.
If it does not advance a legitimate state interest, then it automatically
constitutes a taking. 75 Conversely, if the regulation does substantially
advance a legitimate state interest, then the court performs a balancing
test like the one set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central.76
Specifically, the court weighs the following factors: (1) the regulation's
economic impact on the property; (2) the extent of the regulation's inter-
ference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the
governmental action.77 If the balancing of factors favors a taking, then
the court determines that a taking has occurred and just compensation is
mandated.78
However, since neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Washington
Supreme Court has ever articulated any guidelines as to how much
weight to give each factor, lower courts forced to determine whether a
regulatory taking has occurred have based their analysis "largely 'upon
the particular circumstances [in that] case.' 79 As a result, the constitu-
tional takings jurisprudence that has developed is "generally tolerant of
73. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 10 (internal quotations omitted); see also Sin-
tra, 119 Wash. 2d at 14-15, 829 P.2d at 772-73; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 830 P.2d at 328;
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787 P.2d at 912.
74. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 595, 854 P.2d at 6; Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 14-15, 829 P.2d at
772-73; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 49, 830 P.2d at 327-28; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 329, 787
P.2d at 912. Note that if the regulation does not infringe on a fundamental attribute of property own-
ership and the regulation protects the public health, safety, and welfare, then no taking occurs; how-
ever, it is still possible that the regulation violates the landowner's substantive due process rights.
75. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 595, 854 P.2d at 6; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 50, 829 P.2d at
328; Presbytery 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
77. See Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 604, 854 P.2d at 11; Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51, 830
P.2d at 328; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335-36, 787 P.2d at 915-16.
78. See Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 51, 830 P.2d at 328; Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 335-36,
787 P.2d at 915-16.
79. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining
Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
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actions by the government that serve legitimate public objectives." 80 In
fact, courts rarely find that a government land-use regulation effects a
"taking" of private property that requires compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. 8' Thus, due to its unpredictability, the current judicial rem-
edy available in Washington appears inadequate to protect certain indi-
vidual property owners from bearing the burden of regulations that are
intended to generate benefits for all of society.
III. THRESHOLD COMPENSATION STATUTES IN OTHER STATES
Some states have attempted to provide property owners greater pro-
tection against burdensome regulations by enacting regulatory takings
compensation statutes. These compensation statutes vary in scope and in
the timing of when compensation is triggered. Generally, however, the
statutes require the government to reimburse property owners whose
property value has declined a specified threshold amount due to a gov-
ernment regulation.82 Moreover, such compensation statutes supplement,
rather than replace, the protection of property rights provided by the
Constitution.83 Thus, property owners in these states may pursue com-
pensation under either their respective state constitutions, the U.S. Con-
stitution, or under the regulatory takings compensation statute. 84
To date, at least four states have enacted threshold regulatory tak-
ings compensation statutes. "Florida and Texas have comprehensive
compensation laws, while Louisiana and Mississippi have compensation
laws of limited scope." 85
In 1995, Florida enacted the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property
Rights Protection Act.86 This statute requires the government to provide
compensation for regulations that "inordinately burden" real property,
even if the burden does not amount to a taking under either the state or
Federal Constitution.8 7 Under the statute, a regulation is an "inordinate
burden" when the affected property owner either "is permanently unable
to attain reasonable, investment-backed expectation[s]" for the property
or "bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for
the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at
80. CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at 2.
81. See id at 18; Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings
Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 188-89 (I997).
82. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.11, at 453; see also Cordes, supra note 81, at 212.
83. CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at xii.
84. See id.
85. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 38, § 10.11, at 453 (1998).
86. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 2006).
87. Id. § 70.001(l).
[Vol. 30:287
Property Rights in Washington
large. 88 Determination of when the "inordinate burden" standard has
been met is judicial.89
In contrast to Florida's inordinate burden standard, other states have
established a threshold percentage reduction in property value to deter-
mine when compensation is mandated. For example, Texas' 1995 Private
Real Property Rights Preservation Act provides that a taking occurs
when a governmental action reduces the value of property by twenty-five
percent or more. 90 When a taking is found, the government has a choice
between invalidating the action or compensating the property owner for
the diminution in value of the property.9' The Texas statute applies to
most state agency actions; however, it only covers municipalities if they
are acting extraterritorially. 92 As an additional protection against burden-
some regulations, the statute also requires state agencies to write a "tak-
ings impact assessment" for each proposed governmental regulation.9 3
The takings impact assessment must describe the purpose of the pro-
posed action, evaluate the potential benefits to society and the burdens
imposed on private real property, determine whether engaging in the ac-
tion will constitute a taking, and consider alternatives to the proposed
action.94
Like the Texas statute, the regulatory takings compensation statutes
in Louisiana and Mississippi also use a threshold percentage diminution
in property value to determine when compensation is required. The Lou-
isiana and Mississippi statutes, however, are more limited in scope, as
they apply only to agricultural and forest land. The Louisiana statute re-
quires just compensation to be paid when a government regulation re-
duces the value of agricultural or forest land by twenty percent or more.95
The counterpart law in Mississippi requires the government to compen-
96sate for losses in value of forty percent or more.
In general, state compensation statutes provide a more lenient and
explicit standard to determine eligibility for compensation than the cur-
rent constitutional takings jurisprudence.97 As a result, compensation
88. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
89. Id.
90. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5) (Vernon 2006).
91. Id. § 2007.024.
92. Id. § 2007.003(a)(3).
93. Id. § 2007.043(a).
94. Id. § 2007.043(b).
95. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3601-3:3660 (2003).
96. Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-33-1 to - 19 (West 2006).
97. See Cordes, supra note 81, at 226. "Most... compensation statutes draw a relatively clear
line on when diminution in value requires compensation. To some extent this clarity is illusory, since
different appraisals are inevitable .... Even conceding these problems, however, the test is certainly
clearer and easier to apply than the current balancing required by judicial standards." Id.
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statutes confer greater protection on property owners by holding the gov-
ernment more accountable for the impacts of regulation on private prop-
erty.
IV. OREGON'S REGULATORY TAKINGS
COMPENSATION STATUTE: MEASURE 37
In November 2000, Oregon voters passed a ballot initiative, Meas-
ure 7, imposing the most aggressive regulatory takings compensation law
in the nation.98 Measure 7 amended article I, § 18 of the Oregon constitu-
tion to require the government to pay just compensation to property
owners for regulations that reduced the value of their property. 99 Nota-
bly, unlike the Texas, Louisiana, or Mississippi laws, Measure 7 set no
minimum threshold to trigger the compensation requirement.100 How-
ever, before Measure 7 was implemented, the Oregon Supreme Court
unanimously invalidated the law on grounds that it contained unrelated
changes in a single measure in violation of the Oregon constitution's"separate-vote" provision.'0 '
A. Voters Approved Measure 37
After the invalidation of Measure 7 by the Oregon Supreme Court,
Oregon's electorate did not relent in its effort to protect private property
rights. Rather, in November 2004, Oregon voters convened and passed a
citizen-sponsored initiative'0 2 almost identical in effect to Measure 7.103
However, Measure 37-the new initiative--enacted a statute, rather than
98. See EAGLE, supra note 5, § 9-4, at 1217-18 (reprinting complete text of Measure 7); OR.
SEC'Y OF STATE, BALLOT MEASURE 7 (1999), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/
irr/2000/046text.pdf [hereinafter BALLOT MEASURE 7].
99. EAGLE, supra note 5, § 9-4, at 1217-18; BALLOT MEASURE 7, supra note 98.
100. EAGLE, supra note 5, § 9-4, at 1217-18; BALLOT MEASURE 7, supra note 98.
101. League of Or. Cities v. State, 56 P.3d 892, 910 (Or. 2002). Measure 7 contained an ex-
emption, stating, "Nothing in this 2000 Amendment shall require compensation due to a government
regulation prohibiting the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornography, performing nude
dancing, selling alcoholic beverages or other controlled substances, or operating a casino or gam-
bling parlor." Id. at 905. The court found that the exemption of government regulations that restrict
the right of property for purposes of selling pornography from the just compensation requirements of
the measure impliedly amended article I, § 8 of the Oregon constitution, Oregon's free speech
clause. Id. at 905-06. Accordingly, the court held that two changes were made to the Oregon consti-
tution-an express change to Oregon's takings clause and an implied change to Oregon's free
speech clause-each of which should have been voted on separately. Id. at 910-11. Since the
changes appeared in the same measure, the measure violated the "separate-vote" provision, and thus,
was void in its entirety. Id. at 869.
102. Measure 37 was drafted by a non-profit property rights advocacy group called Oregonians
in Action (OIA). See OREGONIANS IN ACTION, http://www.oia.org (last visited July 27, 2006).
103. See ABSTRACT OF VOTES, supra note 25 (outlining the votes on Measure 37 by county and
showing that 1,054,589 voted for and 685,079 voted against the measure).
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attempting a constitutional amendment, in order to circumvent the prob-
lems that proved fatal to Measure 7.104
Measure 37's ballot title provided: "Governments must pay owners,
or forgo enforcement, when certain land-use restrictions reduce property
value."105 Like Measure 7, Measure 37 set no minimum threshold dimi-
nution in value in order to generate a claim. 10 6 Accordingly, the enacted
statute entitles property owners to receive just compensation if a gov-
ernment entity enacts or enforces a "land use regulation"' 0 7 that restricts
the use of property and results in any diminution in the fair market value
of the property. 0 8 Alternatively, the government may choose to avoid the
payment of just compensation by modifying, removing, or not applying
the challenged land-use regulation "to allow the owner to use the prop-
erty for a use permitted at the time the owner acquired the property.' 10 9
The statutory remedies of just compensation or invalidation are
only available for land-use regulations enacted after the present"owner"''10 or a "family member"''" of the present owner acquired the
property. 2 Thus, a property owner who does not exercise the right to
file a claim and subsequently sells the property to a non-family member
waives any future right to a remedy based on any diminution in value, as
the right does not transfer with the property. Additionally, the statute
contains four other categories of regulations that are exempt from the
requirement of just compensation or invalidation: the statute does not
apply to commonly and historically recognized nuisances, to public
health and safety regulations, to regulations required to comply with fed-
104. Measure 37 is codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005).
105. OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET VOL. 1, supra note 19, at 103.
106. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005).
107. The statute defines a "land use regulation" as including: "(i) Any statute regulating the use
of land or any interest therein; (ii) Administrative rules and goals of the Land Conservation and
Development Commission; (iii) Local government comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, land
division ordinances, and transportation ordinances; (iv) Metropolitan service district regional
framework plans, functional plans, planning goals and objectives; and (v) Statutes and administrative
rules regulating farming and forest practices." Id. § 197.015(11)(B).
108. See id. § 197.352(1).
109. See id. § 197.352(8).
110. Id. § 197.352(11)(C). "Owner" is defined as the present owner of the property, or any
interest therein. Id.
11. Id. § 197.352(11)(A). "'Family member' shall include the wife, husband, son, daughter,
mother, father, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-
law, father-in- law, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, stepparent, stepchild, grandparent, or grandchild of
the owner of the property, an estate of any of the foregoing family members, or a legal entity owned
by any one or combination of these family members or the owner of the property." Id.
112. See id. § 197.352(3)(E).
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eral law, and to regulations restricting or prohibiting the use of property
for the purpose of selling pornography or performing nude dancing.1 3
The statute allows local governments to adopt procedures for proc-
essing claims for compensation, but prohibits those procedures from be-
ing treated as a prerequisite to the filing of a cause of action in court.'4
Property owners who believe that a land-use regulation reduces the fair
market value of their property must make a written demand for compen-
sation within two years of the effective date of the statute or within two
years of the enactment of the land-use regulation, whichever occurs
later.1 5 Once property owners make a written demand for compensation,
the statute allows the government 180 days to compensate the complain-
ing property owners. 1' 6 Only if the government fails to act in the 180-day
time period may the issue be litigated. 1 7 Landowners forced to litigate
their claims are entitled to attorneys fees, costs, and other expenses rea-
sonably incurred in collecting compensation.' 18 Measure 37 did not pro-
vide any new revenue source for compensation payments.' 19
B. Oregon 's Supreme Court Upheld Measure 3 7
Undaunted by the landslide victory of Measure 37,120 opponents of
the initiative immediately sought to invalidate the law. On January 14,
2005, opponents of the measure filed a declaratory judgment action, al-
leging that the measure was unconstitutional based on several provisions
of both the Oregon constitution and the U.S. Constitution. 121 On October
14, 2005, the trial court ruled that Measure 37 violated five state and fed-
eral constitutional provisions, and thus was unconstitutional and inva-
113. See id. § 197.352(3)(A)-(D). Statutes, administrative rules, and local regulations that are
designed to protect the public's health and safety, include fire codes, building codes, health codes,
sanitation codes, solid wastes or hazardous waste regulations and/or codes, pollution control regula-
tions, and traffic safety regulations. Id.
114. Id. § 197.352(7).
115. Id. § 197.352(4)-(5).
116. Id. § 197.352(4).
117. Id. § 197.352(6).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 197.352(10).
120. See ABSTRACT OF VOTES, supra note 25 (illustrating that voters supported measure 37 by
a margin of three to two).
121. MacPherson v. Dep't ofAdmin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 312 (Or. 2006). The plaintiffs filing
the lawsuit included 1000 Friends of Oregon, seven landowners, and five county Farm Bureau units.
Peter Wong, High Court Upholds Measure 37, STATESMAN JOURNAL (Salem, Or.), Feb. 22, 2006, at
IA. The lead plaintiff in the lawsuit was Hector MacPherson, a farmer, who as former Oregon State
Senator was the co-sponsor of Senate Bill 100, Oregon's 1973 land-use law. Id. "It was defended by
the state, which is obligated to do so for all measures approved by voters, and by the measure's three
chief sponsors through Oregonians in Action." Id.
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lid. 122 In particular, the trial court concluded that Measure 37 was invalid
for the following reasons: (1) it impermissibly impeded the legislature's
plenary power; (2) it violated the equal privileges and immunities guar-
antee of the state constitution; (3) it impermissibly suspended laws in
violation of the state constitution; (4) it violated the separation of powers
constraints of the state constitution; and (5) it violated the procedural and
substantive due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. 12
3
Defendants and intervenors appealed the trial court's judgment di-
rectly to the Oregon Supreme Court.' 24 On appeal, plaintiff-respondents
supported the five grounds on which the trial court found Measure 37 to
be unconstitutional, and renewed two additional constitutional challenges
that the trial court had rejected: that (1) Measure 37 impermissibly
waived sovereign immunity; and (2) Measure 37 violated separation of
powers constraints by infringing on executive power and by delegating
legislative power without adequate safeguards. 25 Furthermore, the high
profile case drew more than two dozen organizations and individuals to
file ten amicus curiae briefs. 126 The Oregon Supreme Court heard argu-
ments on January 10, 2006, and in an extraordinarily quick decision,
ruled six weeks later.' 27 The court unanimously reversed every element
of the trial court's decision and upheld Measure 37.128
1. Oregon Constitutional Challenges
The court's opinion began by addressing each of the five alleged
violations of the Oregon constitution.' 29 First, the court overturned the
trial court's ruling that Measure 37 imposed unconstitutional limitations
122. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 312; see also MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., No.
05C10444 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/
Measure37.pdf.
123. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 308, 311-12; see also MacPherson, No. 05C10444 (Or. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ojd.state.or.us/mar/documents/Measure37.pdf.
124. Defendants and intervenors appealed directly to the Oregon Supreme Court pursuant to
OR. REV. STAT. § 250.044(5) (2005). See Wong, supra note 121, at IA.
125. See MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 313-14.
126. See id. at 310-11 (listing the individuals and organizations who filed the ten amicus curiae
briefs). The plaintiff-respondents' lawyer, Todd Baran, claimed that only one of the amicus briefs
squarely supported his cause. Charles Delafuente, Oregon Lays Down Law on Land Use, THE
NATIONAL PULSE, March 3, 2006, at 5 No. 9 A.B.A. J. E-Report 5. That brief was from the Ameri-
can Planning Association and its Oregon chapter. Id. It was submitted by Edward J. Sullivan, chair-
elect of the ABA Section of State & Local Government Law, and his colleague, Carrie Richter. Id.
The rest of the briefs, according to Baran, were either neutral or favored the defendants. Id.
127. See MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 308.
128. Id. at 312.
129. Id at 314-20.
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on the government's exercise of plenary power to regulate land use.' 3 0
The lower court had reasoned that Measure 37 eviscerated the legisla-
ture's plenary power to regulate land use by forcing the government to
either "pay to govern," if it wanted to enforce a particular land-use regu-
lation, or to refrain from enforcing the regulation.' 3 1 However, the court
rejected that reasoning, noting that the legislature and the electorate, act-
ing through the initiative or referendum processes, share in exercising
legislative power.' 32 Thus, the electorate, exercising its initiative power,
was free to authorize the government to decide whether to pay just com-
pensation or invalidate certain land-use regulations in accordance with
Measure 37.133 Accordingly, the court held that "Measure 37 is an exer-
cise of the plenary power, not a limitation on it.'134
Second, the court overturned the ruling that Measure 37 violated
the equal privileges and immunities guarantee of article I, § 20 of the
Oregon constitution' 35 by only applying its compensation and invalida-
tion provisions to landowners who acquired their property prior to the
enactment of the land-use regulation in question. 36 The lower court had
reasoned that by differentiating between property owners who acquired
their property prior to the enactment of certain land-use regulations and
those who took title afterwards, Measure 37 created two unequal classes
of property owners in violation of the equal privileges and immunities
clause. 137 However, the court noted that the protection of the equal privi-
leges and immunities clause applies only to "individuals or groups whom
the law classifies according to characteristics that exist apart from" the
challenged law, not when the law itself creates the alleged classes. 138 In
this case, the court held that the equal privileges and immunities clause
was not applicable, as the only classes of persons affected by Measure 37
were the classes it created.139 In other words, the distinction between
property owners who acquired their property prior to the enactment of
130. Id. at 314.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 315.
134. Id. (emphasis in original).
135. The Oregon constitution provides: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class
of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens." OR. CONST. art. 1, § 20.This provision guarantees equality of privileges to each individual
citizen as well as to "classes" of citizens. Id.
136. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 315.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 316.
139 Id
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certain relevant land-use regulations and those who acquired their prop-
erty afterwards "is significant only by virtue of Measure 37 itself.
1 40
Third, the court rejected the lower court's ruling that Measure 37
waivers of land-use regulations violated the suspension of laws provision
contained in article I, § 22 of Oregon's constitution.1 41 The lower court
had determined that Measure 37 permitted a limited suspension of land-
use regulations by allowing the government to waive regulations only for
property owners who acquired their property prior to the enactment of
the regulations.1 42 The lower court concluded that the resulting limited
suspension of land-use regulations violated article I, § 22 of Oregon's
constitution by providing "a privilege or immunity that is not available to
all." 143 However, the court held that Measure 37 does not "suspend" any
land-use regulation, but rather, "authorizes a governing body to 'modify,
remove, or not ... apply' certain such regulations in specific situa-
tions.' 144
Fourth, the court necessarily invalidated the trial court's ruling that
Measure 37 violated separation of powers principles contained in article
III, § 1 of Oregon's constitution.145 The lower court's separation of pow-
ers holding explicitly relied on its previous conclusions-that Measure
37 impermissibly impeded the legislature's plenary power, violated the
equal privileges and immunities clause, and impermissibly suspended
laws-each of which the Oregon Supreme Court disagreed with.146 Fur-
thermore, the court rejected the plaintiff-respondents' additional conten-
tions that Measure 37 violates separation of powers principles by en-
croaching on the executive power and by improperly delegating legisla-
tive power without adequate safeguards. 147
140. Id.
141. Id. at 317. The Oregon constitution provides that "[t]he operation of the laws shall never
be suspended, except by the Authority of the Legislative Assembly." OR. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
142. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 317.
143. Id.
144. Id. To interpret the wording of the suspension clause of Article I, § 22, the court looked to
a nineteenth century dictionary that defined "suspend" as "to interrupt; to intermit; to cause to cease
for time"; "to stay, to delay; to hinder from proceeding for a time"; or "to cause to cease for a time
from operation or effect." Id. (citing I NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, s.v. "suspend" (1828)); see also Rico-Villalobos v. Guisto, 118 P.3d 246, 251
(2005) (noting that when analyzing terms in original Oregon constitution, the court examines mean-
ings of terms as framers would have understood them).
145. The Oregon constitution provides: "The powers of the Government shall be divided into
three seperate [sic] departments, the Legislative, the Executive, including the administrative, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise
any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided." OR. CONST. art.
Ill, § 1.
146. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 318.
147. Id. at 318-19.
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Fifth, the court affirmed the rejection of the plaintiff-respondents'
argument that Measure 37 impermissibly waived sovereign immunity by
authorizing a claimant to bring an action for compensation based on di-
minished value in violation of article IV, § 24, of the Oregon constitu-
tion. 48 Although the plaintiff-respondents contended that article IV, § 24
does not permit the state to waive its sovereign immunity as to liabilities
for economic consequences of regulation, 49 the court held that no consti-
tutional provision, including article IV, § 24, "forbids the state from de-
ciding that it will compensate property owners for the economic conse-
quences of the state's land use regulations, including waiving the state's
sovereign immunity to permit those owners to assert their claims in
court.' 150
2. Federal Constitutional Challenges
After rejecting all of the plaintiff-respondents' state constitutional
challenges, the court addressed the alleged violations of the procedural
and substantive due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.' 51 The court first overturned the determination by
the lower court that Measure 37 violated procedural due process protec-
tions by failing to provide predeprivation procedures for non-claimants
who may suffer "irreparable harm" as a result of the government's deci-
sion to waive existing land-use regulations on nearby claimants' proper-
ties. 5 2 The court noted that although Measure 37 does not expressly pro-
vide for predeprivation procedures, the measure does not preclude gov-
ernment entities from implementing such procedures. 53 In fact, Measure
37 specifically contemplates that state or local governments "may adopt
or apply procedures for the processing of claims."' 154 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the plaintiff-respondents failed to meet their burden
148. Id. at 319-20. Plaintiff-respondents contended that OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(6) imper-
missibly waives sovereign immunity by authorizing a Measure 37 claimant to bring an action for
compensation, including reasonable attorney fees, expenses, and costs, if a challenged land-use
regulation continues to apply to the subject property more than 180 days after the claimant filed a
written Measure 37 claim. Id. The Oregon constitution authorizes the state to waive its sovereign
immunity as follows:
Provision may be made by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabili-
ties originating after, or existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; but no
special act authorizeing [sic] such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any per-
son claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed.
OR. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (emphasis added).
149. MacPherson, 130 P.3d at 319.
150. Id. at 320.
151. Id. at 320-22.
152. Id. at 320-21.
153. Id. at 321.
154. Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(7) (2005)).
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of showing that the "statute cannot be constitutionally applied under any
circumstance"; thus, the court held that Measure 37, on its face, did not
violate procedural due process. 155
Finally, the court held that Measure 37 does not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the plaintiff-
respondents failed to meet their burden of showing that "the statute bears
no reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest."1 56 The court noted
that although neither the state nor U.S. Constitution requires the govern-
ment to compensate property owners when land-use regulations reduce
property values, they also do not forbid requiring compensation as pro-
vided by Measure 37.157 Accordingly, the electorate was free to enact
Measure 37 in order to further policy objectives such as compensating
property owners for, or relieving them from, the financial burden of cer-
tain land-use regulations. 158 The court held that "[n]either policy is irra-
tional; no one seriously can assert that Measure 37 is not reasonably re-
lated to those policy objectives."'1 59
Cognizant of the intense controversy over Measure 37, the court
concluded its opinion by noting that it was not empowered to evaluate
the merits of Measure 37 as a policy choice: "Whether Measure 37 as a
policy choice is wise or foolish, farsighted or blind, is beyond this court's
purview. Our only function in any case involving a constitutional chal-
lenge to an initiative measure is to ensure that the measure does not con-
travene any pertinent, applicable constitutional provisions."' 160
Although the two federal constitutional issues involving the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause appeared to provide a founda-
tion for an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, neither party petitioned for
a writ of certiorari before the deadline lapsed. 161 Thus, the Oregon Su-
preme Court's ruling in MacPherson will presumably remain undis-
turbed.
155. Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).





161. SUP. CT. R. 13 (stating that parties have 90 days from the entry of the final judgment to
petition for a write of certiorari). The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in MacPherson was entered
on March 13, 2006. See YES ON BALLOT MEASURE 37, http://measure37.com/index.html (last
visited July 27, 2006) (noting that Measure 37 was re-instated Monday, March 13, 2006).
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V. WASHINGTON SHOULD ENACT A REGULATORY
TAKINGS COMPENSATION STATUTE MODELED
AFTER OREGON'S MEASURE 37
The passage of Measure 37 in Oregon and the subsequent decision
by the Oregon Supreme Court upholding its constitutionality has inspired
property rights advocates in several other states to propose similar reform
measures. 162 In particular, Measure 37's success has revived the property
rights movement in Washington, galvanizing efforts to put a similar
measure before the voters on the November 2006 ballot.
In April 1995, the Washington State Legislature approved Initiative
164, a regulatory takings compensation statute known as the Private
Property Regulatory Fairness Act.1 63 The proposed initiative would have
required state and local governments to compensate property owners for
any diminution in the value of real property caused by land-use regula-
tions, 164 unless those regulations were designed to prevent a public nui-
sance. 165 Like Oregon's Measure 37, Initiative 164 set no threshold for
compensation. 166
However, Initiative 164 never took effect. Opponents of Initiative
164 gathered enough signatures to force the initiative onto a statewide
referendum, where it appeared on the ballot as Referendum 48.167 In No-
vember 1995, Washingtonians rejected Referendum 48, repealing Initia-
162. See Leonard Gilroy, States Take Action to Protect Property Rights, REASON
FOUNDATION, May 8, 2006, http://www.reason.org/commentaries/gilroy_20060508.shtml (discuss-
ing steps taken by property rights activists and legislators of other states-including Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin-to enact
their own regulatory takings reform). See also ARIZONA HOMEOWNERS PROTECTION EFFORT
(HOPE), http://www.hopeforarizona.com/ (last visited July 29, 2006) (noting that Arizona's property
protection measure, Proposition 207, will be on the November 2006 ballot); PROTECT OUR HOMES
COALITION, http://www.90yes.com/ (last visited July 29. 2006) (declaring that California's property
rights initiative, Proposition 90, has qualified for the November 2006 ballot); THIS HOUSE IS MY
HOME, http://www.thishouseismyhome.com/ (last visited July 29, 2006) (stating that Idaho's regula-
tory and eminent domain initiative, Proposition 2, qualified for the November 2006 ballot);
MONTANA SEC'Y OF STATE, http://sos.state.mt.us/News/archives/2006/07-20-06a.htm (last visited
July 29, 2006) (certifying that Montana's proposal to protect property rights, Initiative 154, will be
on November 2006 ballot).
163. WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, INITIATIVE 164, at § 2 (1995), http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/
billinfo/l 995-96/Pdf/Initiatives/lnitiative%2OTo%2OThe%20Legislature/NITIATIVE%20164.pdf.
164. Id. § 4(2).
165. Id. § 7(4).
166. Id. §§ 4(2), 7(1).
167. WASH. CONST. art. II, § l(b), (d) permit opponents of a measure approved by the Legisla-
ture to order a public referendum on the measure before it becomes law, provided that the opponents
gather a required number of valid signatures of registered voters and file the petition with the Secre-
tary of State's office within 90 days after the Legislature adjourns.
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tive 164 by a sixty to forty margin.168 Despite Initiative 164's defeat at
the polls, property rights advocates in Washington now feel that public
sentiment has changed and the time is ripe for another try.1
69
A. An Opportunity to Enact a Regulatory Takings Compensation Statute
in Washington. Initiative 933-The "Property Fairness Act"
Much has changed in the decade since Washington's electorate re-
jected Referendum 48's proposal to strengthen property rights by enact-
ing a regulatory takings compensation statute. In particular, the govern-
ment's infringement of property owners' constitutional rights has be-
come more severe due to increasing land-use regulations, 170 coupled with
regulatory takings jurisprudential inefficacy. Consequently, individual
property owners face an increased probability that they will unfairly and
inequitably be forced to shoulder the costs of the public benefits resulting
from land-use regulations.
In response to the increasingly restrictive land-use regulations, the
Washington State Farm Bureau filed a property rights measure, Initiative
933, which is similar to Oregon's Measure 37.171 Thus, in November
2006, Washington voters will have another opportunity to safeguard the
rights guaranteed to property owners by the federal and state constitu-
tions. 172 The official ballot title of Initiative 933 will state, "This measure
would require compensation when government regulation damages the
use or value of private property, would forbid regulations that prohibit
existing legal uses of private property, and would provide exceptions or
payments."'73
168. See 1995 CHALLENGE TO THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT ACT, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/
oralhistory/pdf/OH856.pdf (last visited July 27, 2006) (showing that 544,788 people voted for and
796,869 people voted against Referendum 48).
169. See de Place, supra note 27, at 18-19.
170. See WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, INITIATIVES AND REFERENDA, INITIATIVE 933, at § 1
(2006), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2005-06/Htm/lnitiatives/nitiative 2Oto /
20the%20People/INITIATIVE%/o20933.htm [hereinafter WASH. INITIATIVE 933].
17 1. Id. (reprinting the text of Initiative 933).
172. To qualify for the November 2006 ballot, proponents of Initiative 933 were required to
submit petitions bearing the signatures of at least 224,880 registered voters by July 7, 2006. See
PROPERTY FAIRNESS COALITION, PROTECT YOUR PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS, VOTE YES ON
INITIATIVE 933, http://www.propertyfaimess.com/index.htm (last visited July 29, 2006) [hereinafter
VOTE YES ON INITIATIVE 933]; see also Eric Pryne, Expect to See 1-933 on November Ballot, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, July 7, 2006, at BI (noting that at the time of the deadline, Initiative 933's backers
submitted petitions bearing more than 317,000 signatures in support of the measure).
173. See WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, ELECTIONS: INITIATIVES TO THE PEOPLE (2006),
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/people.aspx (last visited July 30, 2006); see also
Brad Shannon, Property-Rights Initiative's Wording Approved, THE OLYMPIAN (Olympia, Wash.),
Mar. 16, 2006, at lB.
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The stated purpose of Initiative 933, also known as the "Property
Fairness Act," 174 is "to protect the use and value of private property
while providing for a healthy environment and ensuring that government
agencies do not damage the use or value of private property, except if
necessary to prevent threats to human health and safety., 175 In order to
accomplish this purpose, Initiative 933 would enact a statute 176 contain-
ing two major components: (1) a requirement that the government pre-
pare a takings impact assessment prior to enacting any land-use regula-
tion; 177 and (2) a requirement, similar to Oregon's Measure 37, that the
government either compensate property owners when land-use regula-
tions "damage the use or value of private property," or waive the regula-
tion. 178
First, in an attempt to prevent unnecessary takings, Initiative 933
requires government agencies to prepare a takings impact assessment,
evaluating the possible effects of proposed land-use regulations on con-
stitutionally protected property rights, before enacting any land-use regu-
lation. 179 Thus, "prior to enacting or adopting any ordinance, regulation,
or rule which may damage the use or value of private property," the ini-
tiative requires the government to "consider and document" the impacts
of the proposed regulatory action on private property, the estimated
compensation that may need to be paid to affected property owners under
Initiative 933, and any less restrictive alternatives that may accomplish
the same legitimate governmental purpose for the regulation.' 8 ° This
174. See WASH. INITIATIVE 933, supra note 170, at§ 10.
175. See id. § 1.
176. Initiative 933 proposes to add new sections to RCW 64.40 and RCW 36.70A. See id.
177. See id. § 2(1).
178. See id. § 3.
179. Id. §§ 1, 2(l).
180. Id. § 2(1). The full text of §2(1) is as follows:
(1) To avoid damaging the use or value of private property, prior to enacting or adopting
any ordinance, regulation, or rule which may damage the use or value of private property,
and agency must consider and document:
(a) The private property that will be affected by the action;
(b) The existence and extent of any legitimate governmental purpose for the action;
(c) The existence and extent of any nexus or link between any legitimate government in-
terest and the action;
(d) The extent to which the regulation's restrictions are proportional to any impact of a
particular property on any legitimate government interest, in light of the impact of other
properties on the same governmental interests;
(e) The extent to which the action deprives property owners of economically viable uses
of the property;
(f) The extent to which the action derogates or takes away a fundamental attribute of
property ownership, including, but not limited to, the right to exclude others, to possess,
to beneficial use, to enjoyment, or to dispose of property;
(g) The extent to which the action enhances or creates a publicly owned right in property;
(h) Estimated compensation that may need to be paid under this act; and
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statutory requirement for formally analyzing the impacts of regulatory
actions before undertaking such actions will force the government to rec-
ognize the true economic costs of proposed latd-u.se regulations; accord-
ingly, this "look-before-you-leap" requirement will likely improve gov-
ernment decision-making by inducing the government to only enact
regulations when the total social benefit produced by the regulation out-
weighs the total social cost.
If, after preparing the takings impact assessment, the government
decides to enforce or apply a land-use regulation that would result in
"damaging the use or value of private property,"' 8 1 Initiative 933 would
require the government to compensate property owners prior to enforc-
ing the regulation. 182 Alternatively, the government would have the op-
tion of waiving application of the land-use regulation against the affected
property owner, thereby avoiding liability for paying remuneration.' 83
Notably, the initiative is retroactive, entitling property owners to either
compensation or waivers for restrictions imposed any time since January
(i) Alternative means which are less restrictive on private property and which may ac-
complish the legitimate governmental purpose for the regulation, including, but not lim-
ited to, voluntary conservation or cooperative programs with willing property owners, or
other nonregulatory actions.
Id.
181. Initiative 933 defines "private property" to include "all real and personal property interest
protected by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, § 16 of the state
Constitution owned by a nongovernmental entity, including, but not limited to, any interest in land,
buildings, crops, livestock, and mineral and water rights." Id. § 2(2)(a). The definition of "damaging
the use or value" under Initiative 933 is as follows:
(b) "Damaging the use or value" means to prohibit or restrict the use of property to obtain
benefit to the public cost of which in all fairness and justice should be borne by the public
as a whole, and includes, but is not limited to:
(i) Prohibiting or restricting any use or size, scope, or intensity of any use le-
gally existing as of January 1, 1996;
(ii) Prohibiting the continued operation, maintenance, replacement, or repair
of existing tidegates, bulkheads, revetments, or other infrastructure reasonably
necessary for the protection of the use or value of private property;
(iii) Prohibiting or restricting operations and maintenance of structures neces-
sary for the operation of irrigation facilities , including, but not limited to, di-
versions, operation structures, canals, drainage ditches, flumes, or delivery
systems;
(iv) Prohibiting actions by a private property owner reasonably necessary to
prevent or mitigate harm from fire, flooding, erosion, or other natural disasters
or conditions that would impair the use or value of private property;
(v) Requiring a portion of property to be left in its natural state or without
beneficial use to its owner, unless necessary to prevent immediate harm to
human health or safety; or
(vi) Prohibiting maintenance or removal or trees or vegetation.
Id. § 2(2)(b).
182. Id. § 3.
183 Id
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1, 1996, when the Farm Bureau claims that the state started taking a
heavy-handed approach to planning. 84 Furthermore, Initiative 933 ex-
plicitly exempts regulations "that apply equally to all property subject to
the agency's jurisdiction.' 85 Thus, such laws-including building and
fire codes, laws limiting the location of sex-offender housing and adult-
entertainment businesses, and rules "necessary to prevent an immediate
threat to human health and safety"-would be exempted from the initia-
tive's compensation-or-waiver requirement. 86
B. Why Washington Needs a Regulatory Takings Compensation Statute
Governmental restrictions on the use of property in Washington
have increased substantially; 8 7 however, the current judicial remedy for
a regulatory taking is inadequate to ensure that property owners' consti-
tutional rights are protected. Although both the Washington and U.S.
Constitutions require the government to compensate property owners
whose property has been taken,' 88 Washington property owners who
claim a regulatory taking stand little chance of being compensated under
current regulatory takings jurisprudence. In reality, the vague and incon-
sistent standards used by courts to analyze an inverse condemnation
claim, under either the state or U.S. Constitution, rarely result in a find-
ing that a government land-use regulation effects a "taking" of private
property that requires compensation. 189 Thus, certain property owners
whose land is restricted by onerous government regulations are forced to
bear the economic costs of land-use regulations that are intended to gen-
erate benefits for all of society.
Accordingly, the current system is unfair and inequitable, as it al-
lows society to enjoy a public benefit at private expense. When land-use
regulations are intended to protect or enhance the well-being of society
as a whole, 190 the economic costs of such regulations should be distrib-
uted evenly among society, rather than imposed on only a part of society.
In other words, the government clearly must be able to regulate private
property rights for the greater good of society; however, since the benefit
of such regulations is enjoyed by society as a whole, the burdens of such
regulations should also fall on society as a whole.
184. See id. § 2(2)(b)(i). See also VOTE YES ON INITIATIVE 933, supra note 172 (explaining
why the Farm Bureau chose to draft Initiative 933 to be retroactive to January 1, 1996).
185. See WASH. INITIATIVE 933, supra note 170, at § 2(2)(c).
186. See id. § 2(c) (listing laws exempted from the compensation or waiver requirement).
187. See id § 1.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
189. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
190. See CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16.
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To redress the inequities that plague the current system, Washing-
ton should enact a regulatory takings compensation statute. In general,
such a statute should require state and local governments to either com-
pensate property owners for any diminution to the value of their proper-
ties caused by a land-use regulation or, alternatively, to waive individual
enforcement of the regulation. 191 A regulatory takings compensation
statute would protect property owners' constitutional rights by (1) restor-
ing a balance between the government's right to regulate and citizens'
right to private property; (2) protecting property owners' reasonable ex-
pectations and economic investments; and (3) increasing the fairness and
efficiency of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
1. Restoring Balance between Government
Regulation and Private Property Rights
Currently, there are inadequate safeguards against government in-
fringement on the constitutional rights of property owners. Due to the
lack of an effective judicial remedy, individual property owners are often
forced to bear the economic costs of land-use regulations; consequently,
the government has no incentive to consider the ultimate economic costs
of the regulations it enacts, since it does not have to bear those costs.
192
Conversely, a regulatory takings compensation statute would compel the
government to recognize the true economic costs of land-use regulations,
as it would "shift the cost [of land-use regulations] from a few landown-
ers back to the public as a whole."'' 93
Notably, a regulatory takings compensation statute would not hin-
der the government's right to regulate, but rather it would merely prevent
the government from shuffling the costs of those regulations onto indi-
vidual property owners. Thus, despite opponents' contentions to the con-
trary,194 a regulatory takings compensation statute would not prohibit the
government from enacting any land-use regulation that it now has the
191. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005); WASH. INITIATIVE 933, supra note 170,at § 3.
192. See CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at I.
193. Cordes, supra note 81, at 228.
194. See, e.g., THURSTON COUNTY DEMOCRATS, THURSTON COUNTY DEMOCRAT PLATFORM
2006, at 9 (April 8, 2006), http://www.thurstondemocrats.org/newdocs/2006TCDPlatformFinal.pdf
(claiming that Washington's proposed Initiative 933 would "irremediably damage the ability of
regional and state government to manage land use and protect our natural resources and environment
for the public benefit"); Timothy Sandefur, Voters Can Act to 'Save Our Homes,' ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTRAR, June 28, 2006, available at http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/opinion/homepage/
article 1194930.php (noting critics fears that California's proposed property rights initiative, Propo-
sition 90, will "gut government's ability to regulate land-use and urban growth); OR. SEC'Y OF
STATE, OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET: MEASURE 37: ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION (2004), available
at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/m37_opp.html [hereinafter MEASURE
37: ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION].
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
power to enact, including regulations to prevent urban sprawl, preserve
attractive scenery, and protect wildlife habitat. The only difference is that
instead of individual property owners being forced to bear the costs of
such public benefits, the costs will be more equitably distributed among
all of society.
Correspondingly, opponents argue that if no money is set aside for
compensation under the regulatory takings compensation statute, then
most government entities will be forced to waive land-use regulations
because they will not be able to afford to pay. 195 However, any ensuing
waivers of land-use regulations will result in a more reasonable outcome
than the current system, which allows the government to imperil individ-
ual property owners' constitutional rights by forcing them to bear the
costs of regulations that even the government cannot afford to pay. In
fact, a requirement that the government either pay just compensation or
waive burdensome land-use regulations will result in more efficient gov-
ernment regulation, as the government will only enact land-use regula-
tions when the total social benefit produced by the regulation outweighs
the total social cost, which includes compensating property owners who
are financially injured by the regulation. Alternatively, to enable the gov-
ernment to choose the compensation option, voters could put a measure
on the ballot to establish a regulatory takings compensation fund.
A regulatory takings compensation statute would not, however, pro-
tect private property owners against all types of land-use regulations;
thus, the government would not be required to either pay compensation
or waive land-use regulations in every instance. Both Oregon's Measure
37 and Washington's proposed Initiative 933 contain important excep-
tions. 196 For example, both compensation statutes specifically exempt
ordinances, regulations, and rules that are designed to protect the public's
health and safety, such as fire codes, building codes, and health codes. 197
Furthermore, Washington's proposed Initiative 933 expressly exempts
regulations "that apply equally to all property subject to the agency's
jurisdiction.19 Accordingly, a regulatory takings compensation statute
would permit the government to restrict the use of private property, but
would require that the costs of such land-use regulations be equitably
shared by all of society, thereby restoring a balance between the govern-
195. See Allan Brettman, Washington: Backers, Critics Debate the Scope of Proposed Law,
THE OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), July 25, 2006, at A-I; Pryne, supra note 20, at BI; MEASURE 37:
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION, supra note 187.
196. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3) (2005); WASH. INITIATIVE 933, supra note 170, at
§ 2(2)(c).
197. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352(3)(B) (2005); WASH. INITIATIVE 933, supra note 170,
at § 2(2)(c).
198. See WASH. INITIATIVE 933, supra note 170, at § 2(2)(c).
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ment's right to regulate in the public interest and the constitutional right
of citizens to the enjoyment of private property. 199
2. Protecting Property Owners' Reasonable
Expectations and Economic Investments
The price that a buyer pays for property reflects not only the value
of the tangible land, but also the value of the rights associated with own-
ing the property.200 Thus, it is reasonable for property owners to expect
that they will be able to use their property in accordance with the rights
that they paid for. However, property owners' reasonable expectations
and economic investments are destroyed when they are denied the bene-
fit of their bargain due to government regulations that restrict uses of
property that were permitted when the owners purchased their land. Re-
medially, a regulatory takings compensation statute ensures property
owners the benefit of their bargain by either compensating for or waiving
government regulations that restrict uses of property, 20 1 and thus protects
property owners' reasonable expectations and economic investments.
Accordingly, a regulatory takings compensation statute would give
added security to property owners, as they could rest assured that it
would be less likely that their property rights would be taken away with-
out compensation. In turn, such economic protection would likely en-
courage investment by property owners-both individuals and busi-
nesses-which in turn would stimulate the economy, attract new busi-
nesses, and create more jobs.202 Similarly, a regulatory takings compen-
sation statute that gives the government the option of waiving a regula-
tion, rather than paying compensation, would provide an economic boost
by permitting the government to return the property rights they have
taken from individuals, thus allowing property owners the opportunity to
make a more productive use of their land.203
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning & Planning § 37 (2005).
200. See Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d. 400, 409, 348 P.2d 664, 669, (1960) (quot-
ing Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1921)) (suggesting that the "sub-
stantial value of property lies in its use.").
201. See Hunnicutt, supra note 20, at 26 (suggesting that Oregon's regulatory takings compen-
sation statute, Measure 37, is "designed to secure the owners of property in Oregon the benefit of
their bargain.").
202. See generally OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, OREGON VOTERS' PAMPHLET: MEASURE 37:
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3. Increasing the Fairness and Efficiency of
Regulatory Takings Law Jurisprudence
Under the current system, property owners who feel that their prop-
erty has effectively been taken by a government regulation face many
onerous barriers to proper compensation. Specifically, litigating a regu-
latory takings claim is extraordinarily costly and time consuming, pre-
cluding "all but the most wealthy and tenacious of litigants from obtain-
ing justice in our courts. 204 Since most property owners do not have the
financial means or the stamina to fight a lengthy court battle in order to
recover the diminution in the value of their property, most regulatory
takings are not challenged; accordingly, the government generally faces
no consequences for taking property rights without paying for them. Fur-
thermore, even when a private property owner does challenge a govern-
mental regulation that reduces the value of private property, present
regulatory takings jurisprudence is so convoluted that there is little hope
205of compensation.
A regulatory takings compensation statute would increase the fair-
ness and efficiency of regulatory takings jurisprudence by facilitating
private property owners' access to a remedy when they allege that a gov-
ernmental action results in a regulatory taking of their property.2 6 In es-
sence, a regulatory takings compensation statute would clear away gov-
ernment hurdles to compensation and streamline the process by creating
a less stringent and more explicit standard for determining when com-
pensation is owed.2 °7
Although the enactment of a regulatory takings compensation stat-
ute may initially spawn increased litigation to define the application and
interpret the nuances of the law, the electorate must maintain perspective
and not let the near-sighted fear of uncertainty and change stand in the
way of adopting such revolutionary remedy. It is as a result of challenges
to longstanding government practices that so many monumental changes
have evolved. Here, it should be no different.
204. Debate, Taking "Takings Rights" Seriously: A Debate on Property Rights Legislation
Before the 104th Congress, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 253, 270 (1995); See Susan M. Stedfast, Regula-
tory Takings: A Historical Overview and Legal Analysis for Natural Resource Management, 29
ENVTL. L. 881, 883 (1999) (noting the costly and time consuming nature of regulatory takings litiga-
tion)
205. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
206. See CBO REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 16, at 20.
207. See id. at xii, 20. See also Cordes, supra note 81, at 226.
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VI. CONCLUSION
By passing Measure 37, Oregon's electorate demonstrated that the
government had gone "too far" in restricting private property in the name
of the public interest.208 Although the government has the power to im-
pose reasonable restrictions on private property, this power is to be used
for the "public welfare," often times more expansively stated as "public
health, safety, morals, and welfare., 20 9 Since the benefits of such land-
use regulations are enjoyed by society as a whole, society should also
share the costs, rather than forcing individual property owners to bear the
costs alone.
In November 2006, Washington's electorate will have an opportu-
nity to strengthen property rights by enacting a statutory initiative, Initia-
tive 933, which would protect property owners from uncompensated
regulatory takings.210 This statute would protect property owners' consti-
tutional rights by restoring a balance between the government's right to
regulate and citizens' right to private property; protecting property own-
ers' reasonable expectations and economic investments; and increasing
the fairness and efficiency of regulatory takings jurisprudence. Most im-
portantly, this regulatory takings compensation statute would ensure that
individual private property owners are not singled out to bear the burden
of property restrictions that are designed to benefit us all.21
208. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
209. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 37 (1977).
2 10. See WASH. INITIATIVE 933, supra note 170.
211. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
2006]
